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Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* and Richard H. Thaler** 
 
Abstract 
 
The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both 
possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while also 
respecting freedom of choice. Often people’s preferences are ill-formed, and their 
choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points. 
In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped with an 
understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded self-control, 
libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting 
directions without eliminating freedom of choice. It is also possible to show how a 
libertarian paternalist might select among the possible options and to assess how much 
choice to offer. Examples are given from many areas, including savings behavior, labor 
law, and consumer protection. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Consider two studies of savings behavior: 
1. Hoping to increase savings by workers, several employers have adopted a 
simple strategy. Instead of asking workers to elect to participate in a 401(k) 
plan, workers will be assumed to want to participate in such a plan, and hence 
they will be automatically enrolled unless they specifically choose otherwise. 
This simple change in the default rule – from nonenrollment to enrollment -- 
has produced dramatic increases in enrollment.1 
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1 Brigette Madrian and Dennis Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings 
Behavior, 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1149 (2001); James Choi et al., Defined Contribution 
2. Rather than changing the default rule, some employers have provided their 
employees with a novel option: Allocate a portion of their future wage 
increases to savings. Employees who choose this plan are free to opt out at 
any time. A large number of employees have agreed to try the plan, and only a 
few have opted out. The result has been to produce significant increases in 
savings rates.2 
Libertarians embrace freedom of choice, and so they deplore paternalism.3 
Paternalists are thought to be deeply skeptical of freedom of choice and to deplore 
libertarianism.4 According to the conventional wisdom, libertarians cannot possibly 
embrace paternalism. The idea of libertarian paternalism seems to be a contradiction in 
terms. 
Generalizing from the two studies just described, we intend to unsettle the 
conventional wisdom here. We elaborate a form of paternalism, libertarian in spirit, that 
should be acceptable to those who are firmly committed to freedom of choice on grounds 
of either autonomy or welfare.5 Indeed, we urge that libertarian paternalism provides a 
basis for both understanding and rethinking a number of areas of contemporary law, 
including those aspects that deal with worker welfare, consumer protection, and the 
family.6 In the process of defending these claims, we intend to make some objections to 
widely held beliefs about both freedom of choice and paternalism.7 Our emphasis is on 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance, in James M. Poterba, ed., 16 
Tax Policy and the Economy 67 (2002). 
2 Richard H. Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase 
Employee Saving, Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming 2003). 
3 See, e.g., David Boaz, Libertarianism: A Primer (1998). 
4 See, e.g., Robert Goodin, Permissible Paternalism: In Defense of the Nanny State, 1 The Responsive 
Community 42 (1991).  
5 A very brief companion essay, intended for an economic audience and not dealing with law, investigates 
some of the issues explored here. See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, Am 
Econ Rev (forthcoming). 
6 Our defense of libertarian paternalism is closely related to the arguments for "asymmetrical paternalism," 
illuminatingly discussed in Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue, 
and Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for Asymmetric 
Paternalism (unpublished draft, 2002). Camerer et al. urge that governments should consider a weak form 
of paternalism, a form that attempts to help those who make mistakes, while imposing minimal costs on 
those who are fully rational. Our paper, written in parallel, has similar motivations, though libertarian 
paternalism may or may not be asymmetric in the sense identified by Camerer and his coauthors. 
7 See, e.g., Dennis Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office 154-5 (1990), which lists three criteria for 
justified paternalism: impaired judgment, temporary and reversible intervention, and preventing a serious 
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the fact that in many domains, people lack clear, stable, or well-ordered preferences. 
What they choose is a product of framing effects, starting points, and default rules, 
leaving the very meaning of the term “preferences” unclear.  
Consider the question whether to undergo a risky medical procedure. When 
people are told, “Of those who have this procedure, 90 percent are alive after five years,” 
they are far more likely to agree to the procedure than when they are told, “Of those who 
have this procedure, 10 percent are dead after five years.”8 What, then, are the patient’s 
“preferences” with respect to this procedure? Experience might be expected to solve this 
problem, but doctors too are vulnerable to this framing effect.9 Or return to the question 
of savings for retirement. It is now clear that if an employer requires employees to make 
an affirmative election in favor of savings, with the default rule devoting 100 percent of 
wages to current income, the level of savings will be far lower than if the employer 
adopts an automatic enrollment program, from which employees are freely permitted to 
opt out.10 Can workers then be said to have well-defined preferences about how much to 
save? This simple example can be extended to many situations involving the behavior of 
workers and consumers.  
As the savings problem illustrates, the design features of both legal and 
organizational rules have surprisingly powerful influences on the choices made by those 
affected. We urge that such rules should be chosen with the explicit goal of improving the 
welfare of the people affected by them. The libertarian aspect of our strategies lies in the 
straightforward insistence that in general, people should be free to opt out of specified 
arrangements if they choose to do so. Hence we do not aim to defend any approach that 
blocks individual choices. The paternalistic aspect consists in the claim that it is 
legitimate for private and public institutions to attempt to influence people’s behavior 
even when third party effects are absent. In other words, we argue for self-conscious 
efforts, by private and public institutions, to steer people’s choices in directions that will 
improve their own welfare. In our understanding, a policy therefore counts as 
                                                                                                                                                 
and irreversible harm. We think that this account points in many sensible directions, but it neglects the 
inevitable effects of default rules, starting points, and framing effects on choices. 
8 See Donald Redelmeier, Paul Rozin, and Daniel Kahneman, Understanding Patients' Decisions, 270 
JAMA 72, 73 (1993). 
9 Id. 
10 See below for details. 
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"paternalistic" if it attempts to influence the choices of affected parties in a way that will 
make choosers better off.11  Drawing on some well-established findings in behavioral 
economics and cognitive psychology, we emphasize the possibility that in some cases 
individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare -- decisions that they 
would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack 
of willpower.12 In fact the notion of libertarian paternalism might be complemented by 
that of libertarian benevolence, by which starting points, framing effects, and default 
rules are enlisted in the interest of vulnerable third parties, and we shall devote some 
discussion to this possibility. 
Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism, 
because choices are not blocked or fenced off. In its most cautious forms, libertarian 
paternalism imposes trivial costs on those who seek to depart from the planner’s 
preferred option. But the approach we recommend nonetheless counts as paternalistic, 
because private and public planners are not trying to track people’s anticipated choices, 
but are self-consciously attempting to move people in directions that will promote their 
welfare. Some libertarians are likely to have little or no trouble with our endorsement of 
paternalism for private institutions; their chief objection is to paternalistic law and 
government. But as we shall show, the same points that support welfare-promoting 
private paternalism apply to government as well. It follows that one of our principal 
targets is the dogmatic anti-paternalism of numerous analysts of law, including many 
economists and economically oriented lawyers. We believe that this dogmatism is based 
on a combination of a false assumption and two misconceptions.13   
The false assumption is that almost all people, almost all of the time, make 
choices that are in their best interest or at the very least are better, by their own lights, 
                                                 
11 For a similar definition, see Donald VanDeVeer, Paternalistic Intervention 22 (1986). 
12 Bounded rationality and bounded will-power are described in Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev. 1471, 1477-79 (1998). 
13 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U Chi L Rev 947 (1984). For a similar 
complaint, see Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, As Illustrated by a 
Model of Sin Taxes, Am. Econ. Rev. (forthcoming 2003): [E]conomists deserve to be taken seriously in 
some policy debates only if we get more serious about notions of when and how people do and don’t 
pursue their own best interests. To best contribute to debates over regulating private financial decisions, we 
should study when financial decisions are based on fallacious statistical reasoning and study when self-
control problems lead people to borrow too heavily; to best contribute to debates over teenage smoking, we 
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than the choices that would be made by third parties. This claim is either tautological, and 
therefore uninteresting, or testable. We claim that it is testable and false, indeed 
obviously false. Indeed we do not believe that anyone believes it on reflection. Suppose 
that a chess novice were to play a game of chess against an experienced player. 
Predictably the novice would lose precisely because he made inferior choices, choices 
that could easily be improved by some helpful hints. More generally, how well people 
choose is an empirical question, one whose answer is likely to vary across domains.14 As 
a first approximation, it seems reasonable to say that people make better choices in 
contexts in which they have experience and good information (say, choosing ice-cream 
flavors) than in contexts in which they are inexperienced and ignorant (say, choosing 
among medical treatments or investment options). So long as people are not choosing 
perfectly, it is at least possible that some policy could make them better off by improving 
their decisions. 
The first misconception is that there are viable alternatives to paternalism. In 
many situations, some organization or agent must make a choice that will affect the 
behavior of some other people. There is, in those situations, no alternative to a kind of 
paternalism -- at least in the form of an intervention that affects what people choose. We 
are emphasizing, then, the possibility that people’s preferences, in certain domains and 
across a certain range, do not predate the choices made by planners.15 The point applies 
to both private and public actors, and hence to those who design legal rules as well as to 
those who serve consumers. As a simple example, consider the cafeteria at some 
organization. The cafeteria must make a multitude of decisions, including which foods to 
                                                                                                                                                 
ought to consider reasons to believe that teenagers might become smokers against their own long-run best 
interest.”  
14 In some areas, of course, it will be difficult to reach uncontroversial conclusions on the basis of empirical 
study alone, because contested judgments of value are in the background. Do people choose well if they 
choose to marry young, or do they choose better if they cohabit for a long time before marrying? Do young, 
unmarried women choose well if they choose abortion? Empirical issues are highly relevant here, but they 
will hardly resolve all social disputes on these questions. We are not attempting to say anything 
controversial about welfare here, or to take sides in reasonable disputes about how to understand that term. 
For discussion, see Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (1999); Well-Being: The Foundations of 
Hedonic Psychology (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds. 1998).  
15 For claims to this effect, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 
Cornell L. Rev. 608 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. Legal 
Stud. 217 (1993). Important qualifications come from Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law (1992), 
discussing settings in which people organize their affairs without reference to law. But even with those 
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serve, which ingredients to use, and in what order to arrange the choices. Suppose that the 
director of the cafeteria notices that its customers have a tendency to choose more of the 
items that are presented earlier in the line. How should the director decide in what order 
to present the items? To simplify, consider some alternative strategies that the director 
might adopt in deciding which items to “feature” early in the line:  
1. She could make choices that she thinks would make the customers best off, all 
things considered.  
2. She could make choices at random. 
3. She could choose those items that she thinks would make the customers as 
obese as possible.  
4. She could give consumers what she thinks they would choose on their own. 
Option 1 appears to be paternalistic, but would anyone advocate options 2 or 3? 
Option 4 is what anti-paternalists would favor, but it is much harder to implement than it 
might seem. Across a certain domain of possibilities, consumers will often lack well-
formed preferences, in the sense of preferences that are firmly held and preexist the 
directors’ own choices about how to order the relevant items. If the arrangement of the 
alternatives has a significant effect on the selections the customers make, then their true 
“preferences” do not formally exist. 
Of course market pressures will impose a discipline on the choices of cafeteria 
directors, and to that extent, those directors must indeed provide people with what they 
want. A cafeteria who faces competition and offers healthy but terrible-tasting food is 
unlikely to do well. But some of the time, market success will come not from tracking 
people’s ex ante preferences, but from providing goods and services that turn out, in 
practice, to promote their welfare, all things considered. Consumers might be surprised 
by what they end up liking; indeed, their preferences might change as a result of 
consumption.16 And in some cases, the discipline imposed by market pressures will 
nonetheless allow the director a great deal of room to maneuver, because people’s 
preferences are not well-formed across the relevant domains. 
                                                                                                                                                 
qualifications, there is no objection to libertarian paternalism; in the contexts explored by Ellickson, the 
default rule is irrelevant, not harmful.  
16 See Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (1997). 
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Some libertarians will happily accept this point for private institutions. Their 
objection will be to government efforts to reject choice in the name of welfare. 
Skepticism about government might be based on the fact that governments are disciplined 
less or perhaps not at all by market pressures. Or such skepticism might be based on the 
fear that parochial interests will drive government in their preferred directions (the public 
choice problem17). We agree that for government, the risks of mistake and overreaching 
are real and sometimes serious. But governments, no less than cafeterias (which 
governments frequently run), have to provide starting points of one or another kind; this 
is not avoidable. As we shall emphasize, they do so every day through the rules of 
contract and tort, in a way that inevitably affects some preferences and choices.18 In this 
respect, the antipaternalist position is unhelpful, a literal nonstarter. 
The second misconception is that paternalism always involves coercion. As the 
cafeteria example illustrates, the choice of the order in which to present food items does 
not coerce anyone to do anything, yet one might prefer some orders to others on grounds 
that are paternalistic in the sense that we understand the term. Would anyone object to 
putting the fruit and salad before the desserts at an elementary school cafeteria if the 
result was to increase the consumption ratio of apples to Twinkies? Is this question 
fundamentally different if the customers are adults? Since no coercion is involved, we 
think that some types of paternalism should be acceptable to even the most ardent 
libertarian. In the important domain of savings behavior, we shall offer a number of 
illustrations. To those antilibertarians who are suspicious of freedom of choice and would 
prefer to embrace welfare instead, we urge that it is often possible for paternalistic 
planners to make common cause with their libertarian adversaries, by adopting policies 
that promise to promote welfare but that also make room for freedom of choice. To 
confident planners, we suggest that the risks of confused or ill-motivated plans are 
reduced if people are given the opportunity to reject the planner’s preferred solutions.  
The thrust of our argument is that the term paternalistic should not be considered 
pejorative, just descriptive. Once it is understood that some organizational decisions are 
inevitable, that a form of paternalism cannot be avoided, and that the alternatives to 
                                                 
17 For a classic illustration, see Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1983). 
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paternalism (such as choosing options to make people worse off) are unattractive, we can 
abandon the less interesting question of whether to be paternalistic or not, and turn to the 
more constructive question of how to choose among the possible choice-influencing 
options. To this end we make two general suggestions about how to think about these 
problems. First, programs should be designed using a type of cost-benefit analysis, one in 
which a serious attempt is made to measure the costs and benefits of outcomes (rather 
than estimates of willingness to pay). Choosers should be given more choices if the 
benefits exceed the costs. Second, some results from the psychology of decision making 
should be used to provide some ex ante guidelines to support reasonable judgments about 
when consumers will gain most by choosing for themselves. We argue that those who are 
generally inclined to oppose paternalism should consider these suggestions 
uncontroversial.   
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. In Part II, we briefly 
support the claim that people’s choices might not promote their own welfare. Part III, in 
some ways the conceptual heart of the Article, asks whether a form of paternalism is 
inevitable. We suggest that because of the likely effects of default rules, framing effects, 
and starting points on choices and preferences, paternalism, at least in a weak sense, is 
impossible to avoid. To be sure, planners can try to avoid paternalism by coercing people 
to make choices, but sometimes people will resist that coercion (which is along one 
dimension paternalistic too, simply because people sometimes do not want to choose). 
Part IV investigates how a libertarian paternalist might select among the major options, 
including minimal paternalism, coerced choices, procedural constraints, and substantive 
constraints. Part V explores a large question: How much choice should be offered? We 
identify a set of questions that must be answered in order to know people’s welfare is 
likely to be promoted or instead undermined by a large option set. Part VI explores 
objections.  
                                                                                                                                                 
18 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 608 
(1998). 
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II. The Rationality of Choices 
 
The presumption that individual choices should be respected is usually based on 
the claim that people do an excellent job of making choices, or at least that they do a far 
better job than third parties could possibly do.19 As far as we can tell, there is little 
empirical support for this claim, at least if it is offered in this general form. Return to the 
issue of obesity. Rates of obesity in the United States are now approaching 20 percent 
and over 60 percent of Americans are considered either obese or overweight.20 There is 
overwhelming evidence that obesity causes serious health risks, frequently leading to 
premature death.21 It is quite fantastic to suggest that everyone is choosing the optimal 
diet, or a diet that is preferable to what might be produced with third party interference. 
Of course rational people care about the taste of food, not simply about health, but the 
claim that Americans are choosing diets optimally would be hard to support. What is true 
                                                 
19 It is usually, but not always, based on this assumption. Some of the standard arguments against 
paternalism rest not on consequences but on autonomy – on a belief that people are entitled to make their 
own choices even if they err. Thus John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On 
Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government 73 (H.B. Acton ed. 1972), is a mix of autonomy-
based and consequentialist claims. Our principal concern here is with welfare and consequences, though as 
we suggest below, freedom of choice is sometimes an ingredient in welfare. We do not disagree with the 
view that autonomy has claims of its own, but we believe that it would be fanatical, in the settings that we 
discuss, to treat autonomy, in the form of freedom of choice, as a kind of trump, not to be overridden on 
consequentialist grounds. In any case the autonomy argument is undermined by the fact, discussed in 
section II, that sometimes preferences and choices are a function of given arrangements. Most important, 
we think that respect for autonomy is adequately accommodated by the libertarian aspect of libertarian 
paternalism, as discussed below.  
We note as well that the complex relationship between preferences, choices, and autonomy is a 
large theme in the liberal tradition. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (1983); Don Herzog, Happy Slaves (1989). 
Sometimes it is emphasized that preferences and choices are a product of unjust background conditions, 
jeopardizing autonomy, and that when choices are a product of background injustice, respect for those 
choices need not promote autonomy. See Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (1986). Our 
discussion does not engage these issues, but there is a clear connection between such arguments, and claims 
about “adaptive preferences,” see Elster, supra, and our emphasis on status quo bias and the endowment 
effect. See below.  
20 http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/trend/maps/. This represents a 61 percent increase in obesity 
between 1991 and 2000; 38.8 million Americans qualify as obese. See also AH Mokdad et al., The 
continuing epidemics of obesity and diabetes in the United States, 286 JAMA 1195 (2001) (discussing 
increase in obesity). 
21 See, e.g., E.E. Calle et al. Body-mass Index and Mortality in a Prospective Cohort of U.S. adults, 341 
New England Journal of Medicine 1095 (1999). According to the federal government, “Approximately 
280,000 adult deaths in the United States each year are related to obesity. Several serious medical 
conditions have been linked to obesity, including type 2 diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, and 
stroke. Obesity is also linked to higher rates of certain types of cancer. Obese men are more likely than 
non-obese men to die from cancer of the colon, rectum, or prostate. Obese women are more likely than 
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for diets is true as well for much other risk-related behavior, including smoking and 
drinking, which produce over 500,000 premature deaths each year.22 In these 
circumstances, people’s choices cannot reasonably be thought, in all domains, to 
maximally promote their well-being. 
On a more scientific level, research by psychologists and economists over the past 
three decades has raised questions about the rationality of many judgments and decisions 
that individuals make. People fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’ rule,23 
use heuristics that lead them to make systematic blunders,24 exhibit preference reversals 
(that is, they prefer A to B and B to A),25 suffer from problems of self-control,26 and 
make different choices depending on the wording of the problem.27 It is possible to raise 
questions about some of these findings and to think that people may do a better job of 
choosing in the real world than they do in the laboratory. But studies of actual choices 
reveal many of the same problems, even when the stakes are high.28 
                                                                                                                                                 
non-obese women to die from cancer of the gallbladder, breast, uterus, cervix, or ovaries.” See 
http://www.niddk.nih.gov/health/nutrit/pubs/unders.htm#Healthrisks.  
22 See Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason 8-9 (2002). For an interesting discussion, see Jonathan Gruber, 
Smoking’s “Internalities,” Regulation 52 (Winter 2002-2003). 
23 See David Grether, Bayes’ Rule as a Descriptive Model: The Representativeness Heuristic, 95 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 537 (1980). 
24 See, e.g., Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability, 5 Cog Psych 207 (1973); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 (1974); Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, 
Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment in Heuristics and Biases; The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 49 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds. 2002). 
25 See Richard Thaler, The Winner’s Curse 79-91 (1992); in the legal context, see Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel 
Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov, Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 Stan L Rev. 1153 
(2002). 
26 Shane Frederick, Ted O’Donoghue and George Loewenstein, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A 
Critical Review , 40 Journal of Economic Literature 351 (2002). 
27 See Colin Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild, in Choices, Values, and Frames 294-95 (Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky eds. 2000); Eric Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and 
Insurance Decisions, in id. at 224, 238. 
28 For evidence that heuristics and biases operate in the real world, even when dollars are involved, see 
Werner F. M. De Bondt and Richard H. Thaler, Do Security Analysts Overreact? 80 American Economic 
Review 52 (1990) ; Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance 136-147 (2000) (discussing anchoring and 
overconfidence in market behavior); Colin Camerer and Robin Hogarth, The Effects of Financial 
Incentives in Experiments, 19 J. Risk and Uncertainty 7 (1999), which finds that financial incentives have 
never eliminated anomalies or persistent irrationalities. See also Colin Camerer , Behavioral Game Theory 
60-62 (2003), finding little effects from increased stakes in ultimatum games (designed to test the 
hypothesis that people are self-interested), and adding: “If I had a dollar for every time an economist 
claimed that raising the stakes would drive ultimatum behavior toward self-interest, I’d have a private jet 
on standby all day.” Id. at 60.  
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We do not intend to outline all of the relevant evidence here, but consider an 
illustration from the domain of savings behavior. Benartzi and Thaler investigate how 
much investors like the portfolios they have selected in their defined contribution savings 
plans.29 Employees volunteered to share their portfolio choices with the investigators (by 
bringing a copy of their most recent statement to the lab). They were then shown the 
probability distributions of expected retirement income for three investment portfolios 
simply labeled A, B and C. Unbeknownst to the subjects, the three portfolios were their 
own and portfolios mimicking the average and median choices of their fellow employees. 
The distributions of expected returns were computed using the software of Financial 
Engines, the financial information company founded by William Sharpe. On average, the 
subjects rated the average portfolio equally with their own portfolio, and judged the 
median portfolio to be significantly more attractive than their own.30 Indeed, only 20 
percent of the subjects preferred their own portfolio to the median portfolio.31 
Apparently, people do not gain much, by their own lights, from choosing investment 
portfolios for themselves.  
Or consider people’s willingness to take precautions. In general, the decision to 
buy insurance for natural disasters is a product not of a systematic inquiry into either 
costs and benefits, but of recent events.32 If floods have not occurred in the immediate 
past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance.33 In the 
aftermath of an earthquake, the level of insurance for earthquakes rises sharply – but it 
declines steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede.34 Findings of this kind do not 
establish that people’s choices are usually bad or that third parties can usually do better. 
But they do show that some of the time, people do not choose wisely even when the 
stakes are high.  
It is true that people sometimes respond to their own bounded rationality, for 
example by hiring agents or by delegating decisions to others.35 It is also true that 
                                                 
29 See Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler, How Much is Investor Autonomy Worth?, 57 Journal of 
Finance 1593 (2002). 
30 Id.  
31 Id. 
32 Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 40 (2000). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit , Second-Order Decisions, 110 Ethics 5 (1999). 
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learning frequently occurs and enables people to overcome their own limitations. But 
many of the most important decisions people make (e.g., buying a home, choosing a 
spouse) are made infrequently and typically without the aid of impartial experts. The 
possibilities of delegation and learning are insufficient to ensure that people’s choices 
always promote their welfare or that they always do better than third parties would. In 
any event our emphasis here is not on blocking choices, but on strategies that move 
people in welfare-promoting directions while also allowing freedom of choice. Evidence 
of bounded rationality, and of problems of self-control, is sufficient to suggest that such 
strategies are worth exploring. Of course many people value freedom of choice as an end 
in itself, but they should not object to approaches that preserve that freedom while also 
promising to improve people’s lives.36 
 
III. Is Paternalism Inevitable? 
 
A few years ago, the tax law was changed so that employees could pay for 
employer-provided parking on a pre-tax basis.37 Previously, such parking had to be paid 
for with after-tax dollars. Our employer, and the employer of some of our prominent anti-
paternalistic colleagues, sent around an announcement of this change in the law, and 
adopted the following policy: Unless the employee notified the payroll department, 
deductions for parking would be taken from pre-tax rather than post-tax income. In other 
words, the University of Chicago decided that the default option would be to pay for 
parking with pre-tax dollars, but employees could opt out of this arrangement and pay 
with after-tax dollars. Call this choice Plan A. An obvious alternative, Plan B, would be 
to announce the change in the law and tell employees that if they want to switch to the 
new pre-tax plan they should return some form electing this option. The only difference 
between the two plans is the default. Under Plan A the new option is the default whereas 
under Plan B the status quo is the default. We will refer to the former as “opt-out” 
strategies and the latter as “opt-in” strategies. 
                                                 
36 See note supra (discussing freedom of choice as part of autonomy). 
37 IRS Code Section 132(f). 
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How should the university choose between opt-in and opt-out? In the specific 
parking example, it seems to be the case that every employee would prefer to pay for 
parking with pretax dollars rather than post-tax dollars. Since the cost savings are 
substantial (parking costs as much as $1200 per year) and the cost of returning a form is 
trivial, standard economic theory predicts that the university’s choice will not really 
matter. Under either plan, all employees would choose (either actively or by default 
under Plan A) the pretax option. In real life, however, had the university adopted Plan B, 
we suspect that many employees, especially faculty members (and probably including the 
present authors), would still have that form buried somewhere in their office and would 
be paying substantially more for parking on an after-tax basis. In short, the default plan 
would have had large effects on behavior. Throughout we shall be drawing attention to 
the effects of default plans on choices. Often those plans will be remarkably sticky.  
 
A. Savings and Employers 
 
1. Data. Our conjecture is supported by the outcome of numerous experiments 
documenting a “status quo” bias.38 The existing arrangement, whether set out by private 
institutions or by government, is often robust. One illustration of this phenomenon comes 
from studies of automatic enrollment in 401(k) employee savings plans,39 and we now 
elaborate the brief account with which we began. Most 401(k) plans use an opt-in design.  
When employees first become eligible to participate in the 401(k) plan, they receive some 
plan information and an enrollment form that must be completed in order to join. Under 
the alternative of automatic enrollment, employees receive the same information but are 
told that unless they opt out, they will be enrolled in the plan (with some default options 
for savings rates and asset allocation). In companies that offer a “match” (the employer 
matches the employee’s contributions according to some formula, often a 50% match up 
to some cap), most employees eventually do join the plan, but enrollments occur much 
                                                 
38 William Samuelson and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty 7 (1988); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 193 (1991). 
39 See Brigette Madrian and Dennis Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and 
Savings Behavior, 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1149 (2001); James Choi et al., Defined 
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sooner under automatic enrollment. For example, Madrian and Shea found that initial 
enrollments jumped from 49% to 86%,40 and Choi et al. find similar results for other 
companies.41 
 Should the adoption of automatic enrollment be considered paternalistic? And if 
so, should it be seen as a kind of officious meddling with employee preferences? We 
answer these questions yes and no respectively. If employers think (correctly we believe) 
that most employees would prefer to join the 401(k) plan if they took the time to think 
about it and did not lose the enrollment form, then by choosing automatic enrollment they 
are acting paternalistically by our definition of the term. They are attempting not to track 
the employee’s ex ante preferences or to protect against harms to third parties, but to steer 
employees’ choices in directions that will, in their view, promote employees’ welfare. 
Since no one is forced to do anything, we think that this steering should be considered 
unobjectionable even to committed libertarians. The employer must choose some set of 
rules, and either plan affects employees’ choices. No law of nature says that in the 
absence of an affirmative election by employees, 0 percent of earnings will go into a 
retirement plan. Because both plans alter choices, neither one can be said, more than the 
other, to count as a form of objectionable meddling.  
2. Skeptics. Skeptical readers, insistent on freedom of choice, might be tempted to 
think that there is a way out of this dilemma. Employers could avoid choosing a default if 
they required employees to make a choice, either in or out. Call this option coerced 
choosing. Undoubtedly coerced choosing is attractive in some settings, but a little thought 
reveals that this is not at all a way out of the dilemma. On the contrary, coerced choosing 
is simply another option among many that the employer can elect. In fact the very 
requirement that employees make a choice has a strong paternalistic element. Many 
employees do not want to have to make a choice (and might make a second-order choice 
                                                                                                                                                 
Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance, in James M. 
Poterba, ed., 16 Tax Policy and the Economy, 67 (2002). 
40 See supra note. 
41 See supra note. In a separate phenomenon, the default rule also had a significant effect on the chosen 
contribution rate. See Madrian and Shea, supra note. The default contribution rate (3%) tended to stick; a 
majority of employees maintained that rate even though this particular rate was chosen by less than 1% of 
employees hired before the automatic enrollment. Id. The same result was found for the default allocation 
of the investment: While less than 1% of employees chose a 100% investment allocation to the money 
market fund, a substantial majority of employees chose that allocation when it was the default rule. Id. 
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not to have to do so). Why should employers force them to choose? Coerced choosing 
respects freedom of choice in a certain respect; but it does not appeal to those who would 
choose not to choose, and indeed it will seem irritating and perhaps unacceptably 
coercive by their lights. In any case an empirical question remains: What is the effect of 
forced choosing? Choi et al. find that coerced choosing increases enrollments relative to 
the opt-in rule, though by not as much as automatic enrollment.42 Our discussion in 
section IV below offers some suggestions about the circumstances in which it makes 
most sense to force people to choose. 
Other skeptics might think that employers should avoid paternalism by doing 
what most employees would want employers to do. On this approach, a default rule can 
successfully avoid paternalism if it tracks employees’ choices. Sometimes this is a 
plausible solution. But what if many or most employees do not have stable or well-
formed preferences, and what if employee choices are inevitably a product of the default 
rule? In such cases, it is meaningless to ask what most employees would do. The choices 
employees will make depend on the way the employer frames those choices. Employee 
“preferences,” as such, do not exist in those circumstances. We think that across a certain 
domain of reasonable possibilities, this is the situation with respect to savings. Of course 
most people would not like 99 percent of their income to go to savings, and no effort to 
frame choices is likely to lead people to choose to save at that level. But across a range of 
allocations, many employees lack well-forced preferences that are robust to different 
starting points. 
 
B. Government 
 
 Some enthusiasts for free choice might be willing to acknowledge these points 
and hence to accept private efforts to steer people’s choices in what seem to be the right 
directions. Market pressures, and the frequently wide range of possible options, might be 
thought to impose sufficient protection against objectionable steering. But our emphasis 
has been on the inevitability of paternalism, and on this count, the same points apply to 
some choices made by governments in establishing legal rules.  
                                                 
42 See note supra. 
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1. Default rules. Default rules of some kind are inevitable, and much of the time, 
those rules will affect preferences and choices.43 In the neglected words of a classic 
article, a “minimum of state intervention is always necessary. . . . When a loss is left 
where it falls in an auto accident, it is not because God so ordained it. Rather it is because 
the state has granted the injurer an entitlement to be free of liability and will intervene to 
prevent the victim’s friends, if they are stronger, from taking compensation from the 
injurer.”44 If the entitlement-granting rules seem invisible, and to be a simple way of 
protecting freedom of choice, it is because they appear so sensible and natural that they 
are not taken to be a legal allocation at all. But this is a mistake. What we add here is that 
when a default rule affects preferences and behavior, it is having the same effect as 
employer presumptions about savings plans. This effect is often significant. So long as 
people can contract around the default rule, it is fair to say that the legal system is 
protecting freedom of choice, and in that sense complying with libertarian goals. 
Consumers, workers, and married people,45 for example, are surrounded by a 
network of legal allocations that provide the background against which agreements are 
made. As a matter of employment law, and consistently with freedom of contract, 
workers might be presumed subject to discharge “at will,” or they might be presumed to 
be protected by an implied right to be discharged only “for cause.” They might be 
presumed to have a right to vacation time, or not. They might be presumed to be 
protected by safety requirements, or the employer might be free to invest in safety as he 
wishes, subject to market pressures. In all cases, the law must establish whether workers 
have to “buy” certain rights from employers or vice versa.46 Legal intervention, in this 
important sense, cannot be avoided. The same is true for consumers, spouses, and all 
others who are involved in legal relationships. Much of the time, the legal background 
matters, even if transactions costs are zero, because it affects choices and preferences.47 
Here, as in the private context, a form of paternalism is unavoidable. 
                                                 
43 See Korobkin, supra note; Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 New York University Law 
Review 106 (2002). 
44 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedrawl, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1090-91 (1972). 
45 On marriage and legal rules, see Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989). 
46 See Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 Va L Rev 205, 208-12 (2001). 
47 See the demonstrations in Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, supra note; Korobkin, supra note. 
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In the context of insurance, an unplanned, natural experiment showed that the 
default rule can be very “sticky.”48 New Jersey created a system in which the default 
insurance program for motorists included a relatively low premium and no right to sue; 
purchasers were allowed to deviate from the default program and to purchase the right to 
sue by choosing a program with that right and also a higher premium. By contrast, 
Pennsylvania offered a default program containing a full right to sue and a relatively high 
premium; purchasers could elect to switch to a new plan by “selling” the more ample 
right to sue and paying a lower premium. In both cases, the default rule tended to stick. A 
strong majority accepted the default rule in both states, with only about 20% of New 
Jersey drivers acquiring the full right to sue, and 75% of Pennsylvanians retaining that 
right.49 There is no reason to think that the citizens of Pennsylvania have systematically 
different preferences from the citizens of New Jersey. The default plan is what produced 
the ultimate effects. And indeed controlled experiments find the same results, showing 
that the value of the right to sue is much higher when it is presented as part of the default 
package.50  
In another example, a substantial effect from the legal default rule was found in a 
study of second-year and third-year law student reactions to different state law provisions 
governing vacation time from firms.51 The study was intended to be reasonably realistic, 
involving as it did a pool of subjects to whom the underlying issues were hardly foreign. 
Advanced law students have devoted a good deal of time to thinking about salaries, 
vacation time, and the tradeoffs among them. The study involved two conditions. In the 
first, state law guaranteed two weeks of vacation time, and students were asked to state 
their median willingness to pay (in reduced salary) for two extra weeks of vacation.52 In 
this condition, the median willingness to pay was $6000. In the second condition, state 
law provided a mandatory, nonwaivable two-week vacation guarantee, but it also 
provided employees (including associates at law firms) with the right to two additional 
                                                 
48 See Colin Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild, in Choices, Values, and Frames 294-95 (Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky eds. 2000); Eric Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and 
Insurance Decisions, in id. at 224, 238. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 235-38. 
51 See Sunstein, supra note. 
52 The question asked students to assume that no adverse employment consequences could come from 
asking for, and receiving, those two extra weeks in vacation. See id. 
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weeks of vacation, a right that could be “knowingly and voluntarily waived.” Hence the 
second condition was precisely the same as the first, except that the default rule favored 
the two extra weeks of vacation. In the second condition, students were asked how much 
employers would have to pay them to give up their right to the two extra weeks. All by 
itself, the switch in the default rule more than doubled the students’ responses, producing 
a median willingness to accept of $13,000.53  
We can imagine countless variations on these experiments. For example, the law 
might authorize a situation in which employees have to opt into retirement plans, or it 
might require employers to provide automatic enrollment and allow employees to opt in. 
Both systems would respect the freedom of employees to choose, and thus either system 
would be libertarian in that sense. In the same vein, the law might assume that there is no 
right to be free from age discrimination in employment, permitting employees (through 
individual negotiation or collective bargaining) to contract for that right -- or it might 
give employees a nondiscrimination guarantee, subject to waiver via contract. Our 
suggestion here is that one or another approach is likely to have effects on the choices of 
employees. This is the sense in which paternalism is inevitable, from government no less 
than from private institutions. 
2. Anchors. In emphasizing the absence of well-formed preferences, we are not 
speaking only of default rules. Consider the crucial role of “anchors,” or starting points, 
in contingent valuation studies, an influential method of valuing regulatory goods, such 
as increased safety and environmental protection.54 Such studies, used when market 
valuations are unavailable, attempt to ask people their “willingness to pay” for various 
regulatory benefits.55 Contingent valuation has become prominent in regulatory theory 
and practice.56 Because the goal is to elicit what people actually want, contingent 
valuation studies are an effort to elicit, rather than to affect, people’s values. Paternalism, 
in the sense of effects on preferences and choices, is not supposed to be part of the 
picture. But it is extremely difficult for contingent valuation studies to avoid constructing 
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54 See, e.g., See Peter Diamond & Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No 
Number, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 45, 49-52 (1994); Note, Ask A Silly Question, 105 Harv L Rev 1981 (1992); 
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55 See id. 
56 See id. 
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the very values that they are supposed to discover.57 The reason is that in the contexts in 
which such studies are used, people do not have clear or well-formed preferences, and 
hence it is unclear that people have straightforward “values” that can actually be found.58 
Hence a form of paternalism verges on the inevitable. 
Perhaps the most striking evidence to this effect comes from a study of 
willingness to pay to reduce annual risks of death and injury in motor vehicles.59 The 
authors attempted to elicit both maximum and minimum willingness to pay for safety 
improvements. People were presented with a statistical risk and an initial monetary 
amount, and asked whether they were definitely willing or definitely unwilling to pay that 
amount to eliminate the risk, or if they were “not sure.” If they were definitely willing, 
the amount displayed was increased until they said that they were definitely unwilling. If 
they were unsure, the number was moved up and down until people could identify the 
minimum and maximum.  
The authors were not attempting to test the effects of anchors; on the contrary, 
they were alert to anchoring only because they “had been warned” of a possible problem 
with their procedure, in which people “might be unduly influenced by the first amount of 
money that they saw displayed.”60 To solve that problem, the authors allocated people 
randomly to two subsamples, one with an initial display of 25 pounds, the other with an 
initial display of 75 pounds. The authors hoped that the anchoring effect would be small, 
with no significant consequences for minimum and maximum values. But their hope was 
dashed. For every level of risk, the minimum willingness to pay was higher, with the 75 
pound starting point, than the maximum willingness to pay with the 25 pound starting 
point!61 For example, a reduction in the annual risk of death by 4 in 100,000 produced a 
maximum willingness to pay of 149 pounds with the 25 pound starting value, but a 
minimum willingness to pay of 232 pounds with the 75 pound starting value (and a 
maximum, in that case, of 350 pounds).62 The most sensible conclusions are that people 
                                                 
57 See John Payne et al., Measuring Constructed Preferences: Toward a Building Code, 19 J. Risk and 
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58 See id. at 250-53. 
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are sometimes uncertain about appropriate values, and whenever they are, anchors have 
an effect, and sometimes a startlingly large one.  
It is not clear how those interested in eliciting (rather than affecting) values might 
respond to this problem.63 What is clear is that in the domains in which contingent 
valuation studies are used, people often lack well-formed preferences, and starting points 
have important consequences for behavior and choice.  
3. Framing. We have suggested that in the important context of medical decisions, 
framing effects are substantial.64 Apparently most people do not have clear preferences 
about how to evaluate a procedure that leaves 90 percent of people alive (and 10 percent 
of people dead) after a period of years. A similar effect has been demonstrated in the 
important context of obligations to future generations,65 a much-disputed policy 
question.66 This question does not directly involve paternalism, because those interested 
in the valuation of future generations are not attempting to protect people from their own 
errors. But a regulatory system that attempts to track people’s preferences would try to 
measure intergenerational time preferences, that is, to elicit people’s judgments about 
how to trade off the protection of current lives and future lives.67 Hence an important 
question, asked in many debates about the issue, is whether people actually make such 
judgments and whether they can be elicited. And indeed, an influential set of studies finds 
that people value the lives of those in the current generation far more than the lives of 
those in future generations.68 From a series of surveys, Maureen Cropper and her 
coauthors suggest that people are indifferent between savings one life today and saving 
45 lives in 100 years.69 They make this suggestion on the basis of questions asking people 
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whether they would choose a program that saves “100 lives now” or a program that saves 
a substantially larger number “100 years from now.”70  
But it turns out that other descriptions of the same problem yield significantly 
different results.71 Here, as in other contexts, it is unclear whether people actually have 
well-formed preferences with which the legal system can work. For example, most 
people consider “equally bad” a single death from pollution next year and a single death 
from pollution in 100 years72 -- implying no preference for members of the current 
generation. In another finding of no strong preference for the current generation, people 
are equally divided between two programs: one that will save 55 lives now and 105 more 
lives in twenty years; and one that will save 100 lives now and 50 lives 25 years from 
now.73 It is even possible to frame the question in such a way as to find that future lives 
are valued more, not less, highly than current lives.74 The most sensible conclusion is that 
people do not have robust, well-ordered intergenerational time preferences. If so, it is not 
possible for government to track those preferences, because they are an artifact of how 
the question is put. 
C. Explanations  
 
Why, exactly, do default rules, starting points, and framing effects have such large 
effects? To answer this question, it is important to make some distinctions.  
1. Suggestion. In the face of uncertainty about what should be done, people 
might rely on one of two related heuristics: do what most people do, or do 
what informed people do.75 The default plan or value might be presumed to 
capture one or the other. In many settings, any starting point will carry some 
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informational content and hence will affect choices. Hence if a default rule 
affects behavior, it might well be because it is taken to carry information 
about how sensible people usually organize their affairs. Notice that in the 
context of savings, people might have a mild preference for one or another 
course, but the preference might be overcome by evidence that most people do 
not take that course. Some workers might think, for example, that they should 
not enroll in a 401(k) plan and have a preference not to do so; but the thought 
and the preference might shift with evidence that the employer has made 
enrollment automatic. With respect to savings, the designated default plan 
apparently carries a certain legitimacy for many employees, perhaps because 
it seems to have resulted from some conscious thought about what makes 
most sense for most people.76 This interpretation is supported by the finding 
that the largest effects from the new default rule are shown by women and 
African-Americans.77 We might speculate that members of such groups tend 
to be less confident in their judgments in this domain and perhaps to have less 
experience in assessing different savings plans.  
2. Inertia. A separate explanation points to inertia.78 Any change from the default 
rule or starting value is likely to require some action, and even a trivial action, 
such as filling in some form and returning it, can leave room for failures due 
to memory lapses, sloth, and procrastination. Many people wait until the last 
minute to file their tax return, even though they are getting a refund. The 
power of inertia should be seen as a form of bounded rationality. Although the 
costs of switching from the default rule or the starting point can be counted as 
transactions costs, the fact that large behavioral changes are observed even 
when such costs are tiny suggests that a purely rational explanation is difficult 
to accept. 
3. Endowment effect. A default rule might create a “pure” endowment effect. It 
is well known that people tend to value goods more highly if those goods have 
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been initially allocated to them than if those goods have been initially 
allocated elsewhere.79 And it is well known that in many cases, the default 
rule will create an endowment effect.80 When an endowment effect is 
involved, the initial allocation, by private or public institutions, affects 
people’s choices simply because it affects their valuations. 
4. Ill-formed preferences. In the cases we have discussed, people’s preferences 
are ill-formed and murky. Suppose, for example, that people are presented 
with various payouts and risk levels for various pension plans. They might be 
able to understand the presentation; there might be no confusion here. But 
people might not have a well-defined preference for, or against, a slightly 
riskier plan with a slightly higher expected value. In these circumstances, their 
preferences might be endogenous to the default plan simply because they lack 
well-formed desires that would trump it (whatever it is). In unfamiliar areas, 
we believe that this situation is common. The range of values in the highway 
safety study is likely a consequence of the unfamiliarity of the context, which 
leaves people without clear preferences from which to generate numbers. The 
effects of framing on intergenerational time preferences attests to the fact that 
people do not have unambiguous judgments about how to trade off the 
interests of future generations with those of people now living. 
For present purposes, the choice among these various explanations does not 
greatly matter. The central point is that effects on individual choices are often 
unavoidable. Of course it is usually good not to block choices, and we do not mean to 
defend non-libertarian paternalism here. But in an important respect, the anti-paternalistic 
position is incoherent, simply because there is no way to avoid effects on behavior and 
choices. The task for the committed libertarian is not to avoid such effects, but to 
preserve freedom of choice.  
 Because framing effects are inevitable, it is hopelessly inadequate to say that 
when people lack relevant information, the best response is to provide it. In order to be 
effective, any effort to inform people must be rooted in an understanding of how people 
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actually think. Presentation makes a great deal of difference; the behavioral consequences 
of otherwise identical information depend on how it is framed. In the face of health risks, 
for example, some presentations of accurate information might actually be 
counterproductive, because people might attempt to control their fear by refusing to think 
about the risk at all. In empirical studies, “some messages conveying identical 
information seemed to work, better than others, and . . . some even appeared to 
backfire.”81 When information campaigns fail altogether, it is often because those efforts 
“result in counterproductive defensive measures,” in the form of efforts to reduce 
cognitive dissonance by not thinking about the relevant hazard.82 Hence the most 
effective approaches go far beyond mere disclosure and combine “a frightening message 
about the consequences of inaction with an upbeat message about the efficacy of a 
proposed program of prevention.”83  
There are complex and interesting questions here about how to promote welfare. 
If information greatly increases people’s fear, it will to that extent reduce welfare, in part 
because fear is unpleasant, in part because fear has a range of ripple effects, producing a 
wide range of social costs. We do not speak to the welfare issue here. Our only 
suggestions are that if people lack information, a great deal of attention needs to be paid 
to information-processing, and that without such attention, information disclosure might 
well prove futile or counterproductive. And to the extent that those who design 
informational strategies are taking account of how people think, and attempting to steer 
people in desirable directions, their efforts will inevitably have a paternalistic dimension. 
 
D. Beyond the Inevitable (But Still Libertarian) 
 
  The inevitability of paternalism is most clear when the planner has to choose 
starting points, framing effects, or default rules. But if the focus is on welfare, it is 
reasonable to ask whether the planner should go beyond the inevitable, and whether such 
a planner can also claim to be libertarian. To illustrate the problem, return to the simple 
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cafeteria example discussed above. Putting the fruit before the desserts is a fairly mild 
intervention. A more intrusive step would be to place the desserts in another location 
altogether, so that diners have to get up and get a dessert after they have finished the rest 
of their meal. This step raises the transactions costs of eating dessert, and according to a 
standard economic analysis the proposal is quite unattractive--it seems to make dessert 
eaters worse off and no one better off. But many people face problems of self-control, 
and these problems lead to health problems, small and large.84 Once the costs of self-
control are incorporated into the analysis, we can see that some diners would prefer this 
arrangement, namely those who would eat a dessert if it were put in front of them but 
would resist temptation if given a little help. To fit with libertarian principles, the planner 
could arrange two lines in the cafeteria: the tempting line and the non-tempting line. The 
tempting line would include everything, whereas the non-tempting line would make 
unhealthy foods less available.  Since people could choose either line, this passes the 
libertarian test. (As a solution to the self-control problem, it might not be entirely 
adequate, because people would be tempted to join to tempting line.) Hence it is possible 
to preserve freedom of choice, and to allow opt-outs, but also to favor self-conscious 
efforts to promote welfare by helping people to solve problems of bounded rationality 
and bounded self-control. Efforts of this kind need not attempt to provide what people 
would choose ex ante, even in cases in which preferences exist; but they would 
nonetheless allow people to move in their preferred directions.  
 In the domain of employee behavior, there are many imaginable illustrations. 
Employees might be automatically enrolled in a 405(k) plan, with a right to opt out, but 
employers might require a waiting period, and perhaps a consultation with an adviser, 
before the opt out could be effective. Thaler and Benartzi have proposed a method of 
increasing contributions to 401(k) plans that also meets the libertarian test.85 Under the 
Save More Tomorrow plan, briefly described in the Introduction, employees are invited 
to sign up for a program in which their contributions to the savings plan are increased 
annually whenever they get a raise. Once employees join the plan, they stay in until they 
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opt out or reach the maximum savings rate in the plan. In the first company to use this 
plan, the employees who joined increased their savings rates from 3.5 percent to 11.6 
percent in a little over two years (three raises).86 Very few of the employees who join the 
plan drop out. We believe that this is successful libertarian paternalism in action. In fact 
the ideas of automatic enrollment and Save More Tomorrow provide more promising 
models for increasing savings than recent (and far more expensive) proposals for doing 
so by decreasing or eliminating taxes on savings.87  
The same sort of strategy might be used in many domains. Moving from 
paternalism to protection of third parties, employers (or the state) might seek to increase 
charitable giving from workers. Is it possible to produce a form of libertarian 
benevolence, and if so how might this be done? Moral suasion may or may not succeed, 
but compare a system of Give More Tomorrow. Because workers appear quite willing to 
depart with a fraction of their future raises, such a system, like Save More Tomorrow, 
would be highly appealing to many people. In fact the ideas explored here might well be 
used to produce significant increases in charitable donations (of course there are obvious 
complexities about institutional design and appropriate default beneficiaries). 
It should now be clear that the difference between libertarian and non-libertarian 
paternalism is not simple and rigid. The libertarian paternalist insists on preserving 
choice, whereas the non-libertarian paternalist is willing to foreclose choice. But in all 
cases, a real question is the cost of exercising choice, and here there is a continuum rather 
than a sharp dichotomy. A libertarian paternalist who is especially enthusiastic about free 
choice would be inclined to make it relatively costless for people to obtain their preferred 
outcomes. (Call this a libertarian paternalist.) By contrast, a libertarian paternalist who is 
especially confident of his welfare judgments would preserve freedom of choice, but 
would be willing to impose real costs on workers and consumers who seek to do what, in 
the paternalist's view, would not be in their best interest. (Call this a libertarian 
paternalist.) Rejecting both routes, a non-libertarian paternalist would attempt to block 
certain choices. But notice that almost any such attempt will amount, in practice, to an 
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effort to impose high costs on those who try to make those choices. Consider a law 
requiring drivers to wear seat belts. If the law is enforced, and a large fine is imposed, the 
law is non-libertarian even though determined violators can exercise their freedom of 
choice – at the expense of the fine. But as the expected fine approaches zero, the law 
approaches libertarianism. The libertarian paternalism that we are describing and 
defending here attempts to ensure, as a general rule, that people can easily avoid the 
paternalist's suggested option.88  
 
E. Illustrations and Generalizations 
 
 Many actual and proposed legal provisions embody libertarian paternalism. Some 
of those provisions require disclosure of information; some of them shift the default rule; 
some of them preserve freedom of contract but impose procedural or substantive 
restrictions on those who seek to move in directions that seem, to the planner, to be 
contrary to their welfare. We divide this brief catalogue into two parts, the first dealing 
with labor and employment law, and the second dealing with consumers more 
generally.89 
1. Labor and employment law. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), employees are permitted to waive their rights at the time of retirement,90 and 
hence the statutorily conferred right – to be free from age discrimination – does not reject 
the libertarian commitment to freedom of contract. But the employee is presumed to have 
that right unless there has been a “knowing and voluntary” waiver.91 To ensure that the 
waiver is knowing and voluntary, the ADEA imposes a range of procedural hurdles. Thus 
the waiver must specifically refer “to rights or claims arising under” the ADEA92; the 
employee must be advised in writing to consult with an attorney before executing the 
agreement93; the employee must be given “at least 21 days within which to consider the 
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agreement”94; and the agreement must provide for a minimum of a seven day post-
execution revocation period.95 The ADEA has an unmistakable paternalistic dimension 
insofar as it switches the default rule to one favoring the employee and also creates a set 
of procedural barriers to insufficiently informed waivers. At the same time, the ADEA 
goes beyond inevitable paternalism through those very barriers, which significantly raise 
the burdens of waiver. But the ADEA preserves freedom of choice and thus satisfies the 
libertarian criterion. 
 Labor and employment law offers many other examples. The Model Employment 
Termination Act alters the standard American rule to the effect that employees may be 
discharged for no reason or for any reason at all.96 Under the Model Act, employees are 
given the right to be discharged only for cause.97 But the Model Act complies with 
libertarian principles by allowing employers and employees to waive the right on the 
basis of an agreement, by the employer, to provide a severance payment in the event of a 
discharge not based on poor job performance.98 That payment must consist of one 
month’s salary for every year of employment. This limitation on waiver is substantive 
and in that sense quite different from the procedural limitation in the ADEA; in that sense 
it is less libertarian than it might be. But freedom of choice continues to be respected. 
 2. Consumer protection. In the law of consumer protection, the most obvious 
examples of libertarian paternalism involve “cooling off” periods for certain decisions.99 
The underlying rationale is that under the heat of the moment, consumers might make ill-
considered or improvident decisions. Both bounded rationality and bounded willpower 
are the underlying concerns. A mandatory cooling-off period for door-to-door sales, of 
the sort imposed by the Federal Trade Commission in 1972,100 is a simple illustration. 
Hence door-to-door sales must be accompanied by written statements telling buyers of 
their right to rescind purchases within three days of transactions.101 Some states also 
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impose mandatory waiting periods before people may receive a divorce decree.102 We 
could easily imagine similar restrictions on the decision to marry, and some states have 
moved in this direction as well.103 Aware that people might act impulsively or in a way 
that they will regret, regulators do not block their choices, but ensure a period for sober 
reflection. Note in this regard that mandatory cooling-off periods make best sense, and 
tend to be imposed, when two conditions are met: (1) people are making decisions that 
they make infrequently and for which they therefore lack a great deal of experience and 
(2) emotions are likely to be running high. These are the circumstances – of bounded 
rationality and bounded self-control respectively -- in which consumers are peculiarly 
prone to making choices that they will regret. 
3. Generalizations. We are now in a position to categorize a diverse set of 
paternalistic interventions: minimal paternalism, coerced choices, procedural constraints, 
and substantive constraints.  
1. Minimal paternalism is that form of paternalism that occurs whenever a 
planner (private or public) constructs a default rule or starting point with the 
goal of influencing behavior. So long as it is costless or nearly costless to 
depart from the default plan, minimal paternalism is maximally libertarian. 
This is the form of paternalism that we have described as inevitable. 
2. Unsure of what choices will promote welfare, a planner might reject default 
plans or starting points entirely and force people to choose explicitly (what we 
have described as the strategy of coerced choices). This approach finds an 
analogue in information-eliciting default rules in contract law, designed to 
give contracting parties a strong incentive to say what they want.104 In a sense, 
planners who coerce choice are not paternalistic at all. But to the extent that 
such planners force people to choose whether or not people would like to 
choose, there is a paternalistic dimension to their actions. (“Choosing is good 
for both freedom and welfare,” they appear to think, whether or not people 
agree with them.) 
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3. A slightly more aggressive form of paternalism occurs when the default plan 
is accompanied by procedural constraints, designed to ensure that any 
departure is fully voluntary and entirely rational. When procedural constraints 
are in place, it is not costless to depart from the default plan. The extent of the 
cost, and the aggressiveness of the paternalism, will of course vary with the 
extent of the constraints. The justification for the constraints will depend on 
whether there are serious problems of bounded rationality and bounded self-
control; if so, the constraints are justified not on the ground that the planner 
disagrees with people’s choices, but because identifiable features of the 
situation make it likely that choices will be defective. The Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act is our principal example here.  
4. Alternatively, a planner might impose substantive constraints, allowing people 
to reject the default arrangement, but not on whatever terms they choose. On 
this approach, the planner selects the terms along which the parties will be 
permitted to move in their preferred directions. The Model Termination Act 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act are illustrations. The extent of the departure 
from libertarianism will be a function of the gap between the legally specified 
terms and the terms that parties would otherwise reach. Here too the 
justification for the constraint depends on bounded rationality and bounded 
self-control. 
5. A planner might reject freedom of choice on the ground that those who reject 
the default plan will err all or almost all of the time. Such a planner will 
impose significant costs on those who depart from the plan. As we have said, 
there is a thin line between non-libertarian paternalists and libertarian 
paternalists who impose high costs, procedural or substantive, on those who 
reject the plan. Almost all of the time, the non-libertarian paternalist will 
allow choosers, at some cost, to reject the proposed course of action. Those 
who are required to wear motorcycle helmets can decide to risk the relevant 
penalty, and to pay it if need be. Employers and employees might agree to 
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subminimum wage work and risk the penalties if they are caught. In this 
particular sense, penalties are always prices. 
 
IV. How to Choose: The Toolbox of the Libertarian Paternalist 
 
 How should sensible planners (a category meant to include anyone who must 
design plans for others, from human resource directors to bureaucrats to kings) choose 
among possible systems, given that some choice is necessary? We suggest two 
approaches to this problem. If feasible, a comparison of possible rules should be done 
using a form of cost-benefit analysis. In many cases, however, such analyses will be both 
difficult and expensive. As an alternative, we offer some rules of thumb that might be 
adopted to choose among alternatives. In general, it makes sense to experiment with 
possible approaches, to identify their results for both choices and outcomes. We have 
emphasized automatic enrollment plans and Save More Tomorrow because studies have 
suggested that both of these have a great deal of potential. In other domains, plans are 
likely to be proposed in the face of highly imperfect information; more data will reveal a 
great deal. Large-scale programs are most justified if repeated experiments have shown 
that they actually work. 
 
A. Costs and Benefits 
 
 The goal of a cost-benefit study would be to measure the full ramifications of any 
design choice. In the context at hand, the cost-benefit study cannot be based on 
willingness to pay (WTP), because WTP will be a function of the default rule.105 It must 
be a more open-ended (and inevitably somewhat subjective) assessment of the values at 
stake. To illustrate, take the example of automatic enrollment. Under automatic 
enrollment, some employees will join the plan who otherwise would not. Presumably, 
some are made better off (especially if there is an employer match) but some may be 
made worse off (e.g., those who are highly liquidity constrained). A cost-benefit analysis 
would attempt to evaluate these gains and losses.  
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If the issue were only enrollment, we think it highly likely that the gains would 
exceed the losses. Because of the right to opt out, those who need the money immediately 
are able to have it. And in the abstract, it is reasonable to believe that the costs of having 
too little saved up for retirement are typically greater than the costs of having saved too 
much. Few people find that their welfare has been substantially diminished by excessive 
savings. Empirical studies find that revealed choices do not undermine but support this 
judgment. Most employees do join the plan eventually, and very few who are 
automatically enrolled opt out when they figure out what has happened to them.106 It 
would be possible to respond that our reliance on behavior as an indication of welfare is 
inconsistent with one of the central claims of this Article, to the effect that choices do not 
necessarily coincide with welfare. But there is no inconsistency. Compare rules calling 
for mandatory cooling off periods. The premise of such rules is that people are more 
likely to make good choices when they have had time to think carefully and without a 
salesperson present. Similarly, it is reasonable to think that if, on reflection, workers 
realized that they had been “tricked” into saving too much, they might take the effort to 
opt out. The fact that very few participants choose to opt out supports (though it does not 
prove) the claim that they are helped by a system that makes joining easy.  
Once the other effects of automatic enrollment are included, the analysis becomes 
cloudier. Any plan for automatic enrollment must include a specified default savings rate. 
Some of those automatically enrolled at a three percent savings rate -- a typical default in 
automatic enrollment -- would have chosen a higher rate if left to their own devices.107 If 
automatic enrollment leads some or many people to save at a lower rate than they would 
choose, the plan might be objectionable for that reason. Hence we are less confident that 
this more complete cost-benefit analysis would support the particular opt-out system, 
though a higher savings rate might well do so, and a more sophisticated plan, avoiding 
some of these pitfalls, is discussed below.  
 Similar trade-offs are involved with another important issue: The appropriate 
default rule for organ donations. In many nations -- Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Italy, Luxemburg, Norway, Singapore, Slovenia, and Spain -- people are 
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presumed to consent to allow their organs to be used, after death, for the benefit of others; 
but they are permitted to rebut the presumption, usually through an explicit notation to 
that effect on their drivers’ licenses.108 In the United States, by contrast, those who want 
their organs to be available for others must affirmatively say so, also through an explicit 
notation on their drivers’ licenses. The result is that in “presumed consent” nations over 
90 percent of people make their organs available for donation, whereas in the United 
States, the corresponding number is below 20 percent.109 We hypothesize that this 
dramatic difference is not a product of deep cultural differences, but of the massive effect 
of the default rule. Hence we would predict that a European-style default rule, in the 
United States, would produce European-level donation rates.  
The default rules for organ donation do not fit the usual definition of paternalism. 
The issue is the welfare of third parties, not of choosers. Here we are speaking not of 
libertarian paternalism, but of libertarian benevolence: An approach that attempts to 
promote benevolence, and to assist vulnerable people, without mandating behavior in any 
way. We suggest that changes in default rules, or a system of Give More Tomorrow, 
could produce large increases in public assistance – and that such approaches could do so 
in a way that avoids coercion. With respect to behavior, the analysis of libertarian 
benevolence is quite similar to that of libertarian paternalism.  One of the advantages of 
that analysis is the demonstration that when third party interests are at stake, the default 
rule will matter a great deal. It follows that planners can often deliver significant benefits 
to third parties not by coercing choice, but by switching the default rule. In the case of 
organ donation, this is what we observe.  
Does one or another default rule promote welfare? At first glance, the European 
rule seems much better, simply because it should save a large number of lives without 
compromising any other important value. The most that can be said against the European 
rule is that through inertia, perceived social pressure, or confusion, some people might 
end up donating their organs when they would not, all things considered, prefer to do so 
ex ante. (Their ex post preferences are difficult to infer!)  If this objection (or some 
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other110) seems forceful, an alternative would be to adopt the coerced choice approach – 
to require, at the time of applying for a driver’s license, that applicants indicate whether 
they want to allow their organs to be used for the benefit of others. We make only two 
claims about this example. First, the evaluative question turns in large part on empirical 
issues, of the sort that it would be both possible and useful to investigate. Second, the 
American approach is unlikely to be best.111 
 
B. Rules of Thumb 
 
In many cases, the planner will be unable to make a direct inquiry into welfare, 
either because too little information is available, or because the costs of doing the 
analysis are not warranted. The committed anti-paternalist might say, in such cases, that 
people should simply be permitted to choose as they see fit. We hope that we have said 
enough to show why this response is unhelpful. What people choose often depends on the 
starting point, and hence the starting point cannot be selected by asking what people 
choose. In these circumstances, the libertarian paternalist would seek indirect proxies for 
welfare – methods that test whether one or another approach promotes welfare without 
relying on unreliable guesswork about that question. We suggest three possible methods.  
First, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that the majority would 
choose if explicit choices were required and revealed. In the context of contract law, this 
is the most familiar inquiry in the selection of default rules112—provisions that govern 
contractual arrangements in the absence of express provision by the parties. Useful 
though it is, this market-mimicking approach raises its own problems. Perhaps the 
majority’s choices would be insufficiently informed, or a reflection of bounded 
rationality or bounded self-control. Perhaps those choices would not, in fact, promote the 
majority’s welfare. At least as a presumption, however, it makes sense to follow those 
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choices if the planner knows what they would be. A deeper problem is that the majority’s 
choices might themselves be a function of the starting point or the default rule. If so, the 
problem of circularity dooms the market-mimicking approach. But in some cases, at 
least, the majority might go one way or the other regardless of the starting point; and to 
that extent, the market-mimicking strategy is workable. Recall that in the cafeteria 
example, some options would not fit with the majority’s ex ante choices (hot asparagus 
pie, peanut butter soup), and that for savings, some allocations would certainly violate the 
choices of ordinary workers (say, an allocation of 30 percent or more to savings). In fact 
a clear understanding of majority choices might well support a default rule that respects 
those choices even if the planner thinks that an inquiry into welfare would support 
another rule. At the very least, planners should be required to have real confidence in 
their judgment if they seek to do something other than what a suitably informed majority 
would find to be in its interest. 
Second, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that we have called 
coerced choices, one that would force people to make their choices explicit. This 
approach might be chosen if the market-mimicking strategy fails, either because of the 
circularity problem or because the planner does not know which approach would in fact 
be chosen by the majority. We have seen the possibility of forced choices in the context 
of retirement plans and organ donations; it would be easy to multiply examples. In the 
law of contract, courts sometimes choose “penalty defaults” – default rules that penalize 
the party in the best position to obtain a clear statement on the question at hand, and 
hence create an incentive for clarity for the person who is in the best position to produce 
clarity.113 Libertarian paternalists might go along the same track; in fact penalty defaults 
can be seen as a form of libertarian paternalism. 
Here too, however, there is a risk that the choices that are actually elicited will be 
inadequately informed or will not promote welfare. In the case of retirement plans, for 
example, forced choices have been found to produce higher participation rates than 
requiring opt-ins, but lower rates than requiring opt-outs.114 If it is likely that automatic 
enrollment promotes people’s welfare, perhaps automatic enrollment should be preferred 
                                                 
113 See id. 
114 See Choi et al.., supra. 
35 
over forced choices. The only suggestion is that where social planners are unsure how to 
handle the welfare question, they might devise a strategy that requires people to choose. 
Third, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that minimizes the 
number of opt-outs. Suppose, for example, that when drivers are presumed to want to 
donate their organs to others, only 10 percent opt out – but that when drivers are required 
to signal their willingness to donate their organs to others, 30 percent opt in. This is an ex 
post inquiry into people’s preferences, in contrast to the ex ante approach favored by the 
market-mimicking strategy. With those numbers, there is reason to think that the 
presumption in favor of organ donation is better, if only because more people are 
sufficiently satisfied to leave it in place.  
 
V. How Much Choice Should Be Offered? 
 
Sweden recently adopted a partial privatization of its social security system along 
similar lines to those now being suggested in the United States: 2.5 percent of the payroll 
tax is invested in individual accounts.115 The designers of this plan made two decisions 
that we think would draw the approval of most anti-paternalists. First, all money 
managers that met certain fiduciary conditions were permitted to have their funds be 
included among those offered to participants.116 Second, although a default investment 
portfolio was designated for those participants who did not select one for themselves, 
participants were urged (via a massive publicity campaign) to eschew the default and 
instead to select their own portfolios.117 As a result of these two choices, there were over 
450 funds in the plan, and very few Swedes selected the default option.118 It is too soon to 
judge how well the participants did at choosing their portfolios, but we do know that the 
largest market share (about 5 percent) was invested in a fund that invested primarily in 
Internet stocks.119  
                                                 
115 See Goran Normann and Daniel J. Mitchell, Pension Reform in Sweden: Lessons for American 
Policymakers (2002), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/SocialSecurity/bg1381es.cfm 
116 See http://www.nek.uu.se/Pdf/wp2002_6.pdf 
117 Id. 
118 See http://www.nek.uu.se/Pdf/wp2002_6.pdf 
119 Id. 
36 
We outline the Swedish experience to illustrate a more general question. How 
much choice should people be given? Libertarian paternalists want to promote freedom of 
choice, but they need not seek to provide bad options, and among the set of reasonable 
ones, they need not argue that more is necessarily better. Indeed that argument is quite 
implausible in many contexts. With respect to savings plans, would hundreds of 
thousands of options be helpful? Millions? Thirty years ago, most academics had only 
two investment options in their retirement plan, TIAA and CREF. Now most universities 
offer more than one provider and often dozens, if not hundreds, of funds from which to 
choose. Some of the relevant plans, designed to be readily intelligible, seem impossibly 
complicated even to moderately well-informed academics (one of us speaks from 
personal experience). Do participants gain from this increase in their choice set? In a 
standard economic analysis this is a non-question. It is a basic axiom of rational choice 
theory that more choices cannot make people worse off (at least abstracting from the 
costs of making the decision). But a complete analysis, informed by the research on the 
psychology of decision making, is more complicated. It is certainly possible that 450 is 
more than the optimal number of funds to offer in a system of individual accounts. 
Indeed, one recent study finds that when 401(k) plans offer more choice, participants are 
slower to join, perhaps because they are overwhelmed by the number of choices and 
procrastinate.120 
It is far beyond our ambition here to venture a full analysis of the question how 
much choice to offer individuals in various domains.121 Instead, we identify some 
questions that a libertarian paternalist might ask to help decide how much (reasonable) 
choice to offer. Two general considerations are relevant: the costs of decisions and the 
costs of errors. When a number of options increases the costs of decisions, there is reason 
to reduce the number of options -- a reason that might be overcome if that number makes 
it more likely that people will make choices that increase their welfare. It follows that 
numerous options are more likely to be preferred if they will lead to welfare-promoting 
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decisions for many or most (and hence reduce error costs). The more particular questions 
we introduce are a way of specifying the inquiry into decision costs and error costs. Our 
analysis is directly relevant to debates about retirement plans and the privatization of 
social security; in the latter context, it raises doubts about the idea that workers would 
benefit from an extremely wide range of choices.122 
1. Do choosers have informed preferences? In some domains, consumers and 
workers are highly informed – so much so that they will not even be influenced by 
default rules. Most adults have experimented enough over the course of their lives to 
have a good sense of what flavors of ice cream they like. They can do a decent job of 
picking even in a shop offering dozens of flavors. If the default option is asparagus-
flavored ice cream, they will be unlikely to choose it, and might well be annoyed. But 
when faced with a menu listing many unfamiliar foods in a foreign country, people might 
not be benefited by being asked to choose among them, and they might prefer a small list 
or ask the waiter for a default suggestion (e.g., what do other tourists like?). Clever 
restaurants catering to tourists often offer a default “tourist menu.” Many actual choices 
fall between the poles of ice cream flavors and foreign menus. When information is 
limited, countless options increase the costs of decisions without increasing the likelihood 
of accuracy. But when choosers are highly informed, numerous options decrease the 
likelihood of error and do not greatly increase decision costs, simply because informed 
choosers can more easily navigate the menu of options. 
2. Is the mapping from options to preferences transparent? If we order a coffee 
ice cream cone, we have a pretty good idea what we will consume. If we invest $10,000 
in a mix of mutual funds, we have little idea (without the aid of sophisticated software) 
what a change in the portfolio will do to our distribution of expected returns in 
retirement. When we choose between health plans, we may not fully understand all the 
ramifications of our choice. If I get a rare disease, will I be able to see a good specialist? 
How long will I have to wait in line? When people have a hard time predicting how their 
choices will end up affecting their lives, they have less to gain by numerous options and 
perhaps even by choosing for themselves. If it is hard to map from options to preferences, 
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a large set of choices is likely to be cognitively overwhelming, and thus to increase the 
costs of decisions without also increasing welfare by reducing errors. 
3. How much do preferences vary across individuals? Some people smoke; others 
hate the smell of smoke. Some people like hard mattresses; others like soft ones. How do 
hotels deal with this problem? Most choose to cater to differences in tastes with respect to 
smoking but not with respect to mattresses. The mattress that appeals to the median hotel 
guest seems to be good enough to satisfy most customers, but the threat of a smoky room 
(or a night without cigarettes) is enough to scare customers away. Here is a case in which 
many people have well-formed preferences that trump default rules. Many planners, both 
private and public, must make similar tradeoffs.  Since offering choice is costly, sensible 
planners make multiple choices available when people’s preferences vary most. The 
argument for a large option set is thus strongest in cases of preferences that are both clear 
and heterogeneous. In such cases, people’s welfare is likely to be promoted if each can 
choose as he sees fit, and homogeneity will lead to inaccuracy and thus widespread error 
costs. 
4. Do consumers value choosing for themselves, per se? Freedom of choice is 
itself an ingredient in welfare. In some situations people derive welfare from the very act 
of choosing. But sometimes it is a chore to have to choose,123 and the relevant taste can 
differ across individuals. (One of us derives pleasure from reading and choosing from a 
wine list, the other finds that enterprise basically intolerable.124)  The point very much 
bears on the decision whether to force explicit choices or instead to adopt a default rule 
that reflects what the majority wants. If making choices is itself a subjective good, the 
argument for forced choices is strengthened. But much of the time, especially in technical 
areas, people do not particularly enjoy the process of choice, and a large number of 
options is a burden. By contrast, a thoughtfully chosen default rule, steering them in 
sensible directions, is a blessing.  
 
                                                 
123 Hence the association between choice and welfare is doubly contingent: Choice may or may not 
promote welfare, and choice may or may not be an ingredient in welfare. We are putting to one side the 
association between freedom of choice and autonomy, see note supra, and focussing here on the number of 
options to be provided.  
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VI. Objections 
 
The argument for libertarian paternalism seems compelling to us, even obvious, 
but we suspect that hard-line anti-paternalists, and possibly others, will have objections. 
We respond to three possible objections here. 
The first objection is that by advocating libertarian paternalism, we are starting 
down a very slippery slope. Once one grants the possibility that default rules for savings 
or cafeteria lines should be designed paternalistically, it might seem impossible to resist 
highly non-libertarian interventions. Critics might envisage an onslaught of what seem, to 
them, to be unacceptably intrusive forms of paternalism, from requiring motorcycle riders 
to wear helmets to mandatory waiting periods before consumer purchases to bans on 
cigarette smoking to intrusive health care reforms of many imaginable kinds. In the face 
of the risk of overreaching, might it not be better to avoid starting down the slope at all? 
There are three responses. First, in many cases there is simply no viable 
alternative to paternalism in the weak sense, and hence planners are forced to take a least 
a few tiny steps down that slope. Recall that paternalism, in the form of effects on 
behavior, is frequently inevitable. In such cases, the slope cannot be avoided. Second, the 
libertarian condition, requiring opt-out rights, sharply limits the steepness of the slope. So 
long as paternalistic interventions can be easily avoided by those who seek to adopt a 
course of their own, the risks emphasized by anti-paternalists are minimal. Third, those 
who make the slippery slope argument are acknowledging the existence of a self-control 
problem, at least for planners. But if planners, including bureaucrats and human resource 
managers, suffer from self-control problems, then it is highly likely that other people do 
too.125  
A second and different sort of objection is based on a deep mistrust of the ability 
of the planner (especially the planner working for government) to make sensible choices. 
Even those who normally believe that everyone chooses rationally treat with deep 
skepticism any proposal that seems to hinge on rational choices by bureaucrats. Part of 
                                                                                                                                                 
124 A more serious example comes from evidence that many patients do not want to make complex medical 
decisions and would prefer their doctors to choose for them. See Carl Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy 
(1998). 
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the skepticism is based on a belief that bureaucrats lack the discipline imposed by market 
pressures; part of it is rooted in the fear that well-organized private groups will move 
bureaucrats in their preferred directions. We happily grant that planners are human,126 
and thus are both boundedly rational and subject to the influence of objectionable 
pressures. Nevertheless, as we have stressed, these human planners are sometimes forced 
to make choices, and it is surely better to have them trying to improve people’s welfare 
rather than the opposite. In emphasizing the important effect of plan design on choice (a 
point underappreciated by economists, lawyers, and planners), we hope to encourage plan 
designers to become more informed. And by arguing for a libertarian check on bad plans, 
we hope to create a strong safeguard against ill-considered or ill-motivated plans. 
A third objection would come from the opposite direction. Enthusiastic 
paternalists, emboldened by evidence of bounded rationality and self-control problems, 
might urge that in many domains, the libertarian position is quite implausible. At least if 
the focus is entirely or mostly on welfare, it might seem clear that in certain 
circumstances, people should not be given freedom of choice, for the simple reason that 
they will choose poorly. In those circumstances, why should anyone insist on libertarian 
paternalism, as opposed to unqualified or nonlibertarian paternalism?  
This objection raises complex issues of both value and fact, and we do not intend 
to venture into difficult philosophical territory here.127 Our basic response is threefold. 
First, we reiterate our understanding that planners are human, and so the real comparison 
is between boundedly rational choosers with self-control problems and boundedly 
rational planners facing self-control problems of their own.128 It is doubtful that the 
comparison can sensibly be made in the abstract. Second, an opt-out right operates as a 
safeguard against confused or improperly motivated planners, and in many contexts, that 
safeguard is crucial even if it potentially creates harm as well. Third, nothing we have 
said denies the possibility that in some circumstances, it makes best sense to impose 
significant costs on those who reject the proposed course of action, or even to deny 
freedom of choice altogether. Indeed, the discussion in Part V can easily be developed 
                                                                                                                                                 
125 We acknowledge that bureaucrats might be subject to distinctive pressures that aggravate self-control 
problems. 
126 See Jolls, supra note, at 1543. 
127 See Dworkin, supra note, for discussion.  
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into an account of what those circumstances are likely to be. The factors identified there 
might well be taken as a basis for deciding whether and when to block choices. Our only 
qualification is that when third party effects are not present, the general presumption 
should be in favor of freedom of choice, and that presumption should be rebutted only 
when individual choice is demonstrably inconsistent with individual welfare.129 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our goal here has been to describe and to defend libertarian paternalism – an 
approach that preserves freedom of choice but that authorizes both private and public 
institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their welfare. Some kind of 
paternalism is likely whenever such institutions set out arrangements that prevail unless 
people affirmatively choose otherwise. Our central empirical claim has been that in many 
domains, people’s preferences are labile and ill-formed, and hence starting points and 
default rules are likely to be quite sticky. In these circumstances, the goal should be to 
avoid random, inadvertent, arbitrary, or harmful effects and to produce a situation that is 
likely to promote people’s welfare, suitably defined. Indeed, many current social 
outcomes are, we believe, both random or inadvertent, in the sense that they are a product 
of default rules whose behavior-shaping effects have never been a product of serious 
reflection. 
When the direct welfare inquiry is too hard to handle, libertarian paternalists have 
a range of alternatives. They might, for example, select an approach that would be sought 
by the majority, that requires or promotes explicit choices, or that minimizes opt-outs. 
We have also identified the factors that make it most sensible to increase the range of 
options, in an effort to show that the relationship between choice and welfare presents 
tractable empirical questions, and should not be resolved by dogmas, a priori arguments, 
and definitions. In our view, libertarian paternalism is not only a conceptual possibility; it 
also provides a foundation for rethinking many areas of private and public law. 
                                                                                                                                                 
128 See the discussion of behavioral bureaucrats in Jolls et al., supra note, at 1543-45. 
129 This is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one; believers in autonomy will not agree that welfarist 
concerns override freedom of choice. We do not attempt to speak to the underlying debates here; libertarian 
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